PRAYING FOR BABY RENA: RELIGIOUS
LIBERTY, MEDICAL FUTILITY, AND MIRACLESt
David M. Smolin *
Few of us could look a dying child in the face and not hope
that there are miracles in this world. Few would want to deny the
parents of a dying child the hope, however slim, that a miracle
could occur. Few physicians, however, would want to base the
course of medical care upon such hopes.
This Article explores a conflict between an empiricist, rationalistic medical science with a religious system in which miracles are
viewed as an ordinary occurrence. The legal contexts of this conflict include the religion clauses of the First Amendment, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), and the emerging concept
of medical futility. The complex legal issues will be made more
vivid through the particularities of the Baby Rena story.
This Article will further address the role of both religion and

religious believers in public life. Initially, it may seem startling to
include a matter so intensely private as the medical care of a dying
child in a discussion of religion and public life.1 Yet, bioethical decisions are, for better or worse, typically viewed as matters of public
policy. The disturbing truth is that we cannot even die without
raising public policy issues; an attempt to rigorously "privatize" religion, or separate it completely from public life, would leave religion with no place to go but the next world. We may, based in part

on a religious belief, wish (or not wish) a certain treatment for
ourselves or our family members. This wish, however, involves the

medical personnel and institutions who must provide the care, and
ultimately implicates the entire society's allocation of a scarce resource. Individual and societal decisions about medical treatment
must be discussed, and sometimes such discussions will find their
way into legislative halls, legal codes, and judicial decisions. Thus,
t This Article was delivered at the Symposium on Medical Futility, on November
9, 1994, at the Seton Hall University School of Law.
* Professor of Law, Cumberland Law School, Samford University;, Fellow, Southern Center for Law and Ethics. The author expresses thanks to Jennifer Foley, Bill
Keever, and Kyle Petteway for their research assistance.
1 For this reason, I was initially startled when my co-panelists on the subject of
religion and medical futility, Philip Boyle and Marc Stem, raised the issue of religion
and public life, as well as the work of Kent Greenawalt on that subject. Upon reflection, I have concluded that my co-panelists were raising useful points, and thus have
attempted to respond.
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the highly private is transposed into the highly public, and what
began as a simple religious act in the face of death or disease becomes a public discourse. This insight that even the "private" frequently becomes "public" should inform discussions of the
appropriate place of religion in "public" life.
Some years ago, Kent Greenawalt noted that "[t] he most obvious conflict of religious conviction and publicly accessible reasons
occurs if one's religiously based factual conclusions clearly contradict all rational estimates."' Greenawalt proposed that a liberal democracy embraces shared forms of reasoning, among which were
the scientific and common sense assumptions that "the regularities
of the physical world consistently apply."3 Greenawalt denied that
belief "in a powerful God, capable of suspending ordinary physical
laws, who has chosen to disclose in advance some of the occasions
when that will happen, and who has made such a disclosure in this
instance"4 could legitimately play a role in the political reasoning
of the "good liberal citizen."5 Greenawalt thus might deny that the
possibility of miracles can play any role in "political" discourse on
medical futility and the allocation of health care. This Article is, in
part, an examination of Professor Greenawalt's thesis, in light of a
particularly poignant set of facts.
I.

THE LFE ANDDEATH OF BABY RENA

Baby Rena was infected at birth with HIV; her mother abandoned her to the custody of the District of Columbia.6 An evangel2 KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS AND POLITICAL CHOICE 204 (1988).

3 Id. at 205.
4 Id.
5 Id. at 203; see generally id. at 203-06. I do not claim to know how Professor Greenawait would apply his views to the Baby Rena case, or to questions of medical futility,
particularly given the paradox of personal and familial medical decisionmaking becoming questions of public policy, public funding, and public discourse. Nor do I
attempt, in this article, to take account of Professor Greenawalt's latest book, Private
Consciences and Public Reasons (forthcoming 1995). Nonetheless, the article does examine the conflict, raised by Professor Greenawalt, between religious decisionmaking
centering on miracles and 'secular' decisionmaking centering on empirical
knowledge.
6 The conflict concerning the medical treatment of Baby Rena, like most such
conflicts, never produced any litigation. The primary source for the facts comes from

an in-depth, two-part article in The Washington Post. See Benjamin Weiser, The Case of
Baby Rena, WASH. POST,July 14, 1991, at Al (Part I) [hereinafter Part I]; Benjamin
Weiser, The Case ofBaby Rena, WASH. PoST,July 15, 1991, at Al (Part II) [hereinafter
Part II]. Dr. Murray M. Pollack, Baby Rena's physician, later published his own account and analysis. See Murray M. Pollack, SurrogateDecision Makers and Respect: Commentary on "The Many Faces of Autonomy," 3 J. CLINICAL ETmICs 303 (1992). The
unusually detailed description of the facts, including the motivations of the parties, is
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ical Christian couple became interested in Baby Rena when she was
four months old. Hospital employees informed the couple that
Baby Rena, a boarder baby, was "available," and that the baby
would contract AIDS and die.7 The couple "asked God through
prayer, how can we minister to this little child."' They believed
that "God told us, take the child, and rear her in the nurture and
admonition of God's word so that she would be a testimony to the
body of Christ."9 It seems that, from the outset, the couple envisioned themselves in a spiritual battle against the AIDS disease,
rather than merely providing love and nurture to a dying child.
Thus, they "armed" themselves "to do battle against the spirits of
infirmity-in this particular case, against HIV-which the doctors
had diagnosed."' °
Two weeks after the couple met Rena, she was placed on a
respirator and diagnosed as suffering from pneumocystis carinii
pneumonia. Physicians thought she was dying. The couple, along
with their pastor, visited Rena, and prayed at her bedside. The
couple also completed the required courses to become foster parents." A specialist informed the couple of the grim prognosis:
Rena had "excessive cerebral spinal fluid in her brain, which might
cause paralysis from the neck down." 2 She also suffered from kidney abnormalities requiring continuous medication, and from dysflexia of the eyes." The couple, told they could walk out on Rena,
replied that they wanted "to do what the Bible said, apply every
principle, precept that we can concerning God's word."14
Surprisingly, Rena rebounded over the next two months. The
doctors considered it an "incredible" . . . "medical success;" the
foster parents considered it a "miracle" that "happened spiritually." 15 At nine months, Baby Rena was healthy enough to go
home with her foster parents. The foster parents brought Rena to
their church, and the congregation, despite knowing that Rena was
actually far beyond that found in most published legal opinions. The Baby Rena
"case" has therefore entered the broader dialogue on the emerging issue of medical
futility.
7 Part I, supra note 6, at A18.
8 Id.
9 Id.
10 Id.

11 See id.
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 Id. at A19.
'5 Id.
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infected with HIV, "accepted her [and] . . . took her on in."16
Rena was able to live with her foster family at their home for
about six months, and she celebrated her first birthday and Christmas with family and friends. At fifteen months, Rena suffered from
cardiac failure with respiratory distress; she was hospitalized and
placed on a respirator. Rena required increasingly large doses of
painkillers to "keep her from becoming agitated and thrashing in
pain."7 Her blood pressure rose to dangerous levels. 8
Dr. Pollack, who had taken over the case, came to believe that
the respirator should be removed. The child was in pain, and
there was, Dr. Pollack believed, no hope of recovery. Rena's foster
parents, however, continued to speak of taking Rena home; they
wanted aggressive treatment. A meeting was arranged among the
foster parents, Dr. Pollack, the head of the ethics committee, and
several physicians. The purpose of the meeting was to solicit the
foster parents' support for withdrawing the respirator. Dr. Pollack
apparently hoped that establishing a consensus among the foster
parents, treating physician, and the ethics committee would help
persuade the city, Rena's legal guardian, to authorize withdrawal of
the respirator.1 9
The meeting produced conflict rather than consensus. Dr.
Pollack explained at length that Rena's position was hopeless, that
she would die soon, and that the pain and suffering were unjustified. The ethics head also concluded that they were prolonging
Rena's death. The foster father responded by describing his beliefs
in God. The foster family wanted Rena to stay on the respirator.
In the end, the parents agreed that Rena could be removed from
the respirator, but only as a test of Rena's condition. They insisted
she be returned to the respirator if she proved unable to breathe
on her own.2 0
Dr. Pollack, despite the foster parents' negative response, still
initiated a request, through the hospital attorney, that the city approve permanent removal of the respirator. The Department of
Human Resources (DHR) attorney, responding for the city, de16 Id.
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 Id.

See id. It appears reasonably clear from The Washington Post article that permission of the foster parents was, at this point in time, considered a preparatory step to
seeking permission from the city, rather than being sufficient in itself. The foster
parents presumably lacked clear legal authority to approve withdrawal of the respirator, at least over the objections of the city, Rena's legal guardian.
20
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clined to grant such permission, believing that the hospital ought
to go to court to obtain consent. Physicians, the DHR attorney believed, "don't really want to have to justify their actions" and have
their decisions "scrutinized."21 The DHR attorney was concerned
that the hospital might have financial motivations. Medicaid covered only a portion of the cost of Rena's care, leaving the hospital
responsible for the costs of the remainder of her care. 2
The hospital staff, however, was coming to believe that their
continued treatment of Rena amounted to "torture," and that they
sometimes were the "torturers."23 Rena was being kept alive by the
respirator, but the only way to relieve her pain was to sedate her.
Dr. Pollack, frustrated by the refusals of the city and foster parents
to approve removal of the respirator, asked that an ethics committee be convened to give him guidance. The foster parents and a
representative of the city attended.24
Pollack described the medical situation, and stated that Rena
might live for weeks or months on the respirator; the only way to
relieve her pain was to "'sedate her so much that there's not much
purpose in living.'" 2 - Efforts to wean her from the respirator had
failed. She was sure to die, either from AIDS, or from her heart
and lung disease.26
The foster father responded with a long presentation of the
couple's religious perspective. He sketched three pictures, representing Rena's body, soul, and spirit. He conceded that the AIDS
virus was "real, because you can see it under the microscope. "27 He
praised the medical personnel for working hard at meeting Rena's
medical and social needs, an apparent reference to care of Rena's
body and soul. The spiritual side, however, was being ignored.
The father stated, "It seems to me that until the hospital really addresses the spiritual area we won't be able to defeat these various
spirits of infirmity, including AIDS, that we're fighting against
here."28
Rena's care, insisted the father, "should be motivated by a spiritual sense of obedience to God. It's most important to find out
what God desires . . . for Rena, because the one who gives life
21
22
23
24
25

Part II, supra note 6,at Al.
Id. at Al, A6.

Id. at A6.
Id.
Id.

26

Id.

27
28

Id.
Id.
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should ultimately be the one who allows life to be taken. God has
not given man the authority to serve as God." 9 While the physicians had abandoned hope, based on Rena's physical condition,
the father felt that "[i]f we give up now, we won't fully understand
We won't fully know that God's word is true." Many of the
....
members of the ethics committee had "discomfort and wonder" on
their faces as they listened to the father's lengthy discourse. 0
The representative from the city indicated that they were unlikely to change their position, a stance which Dr. Pollack later interpreted as "presumably" stemming from "potential political
ramifications." 3 ' The ethics chair proposed that "after a reasonable amount of time had passed and it was clear that further treatment was futile, the physician could act alone-'that this is a
professional decision to be made, based on futility."'3 2 Pollack suggested that the hospital could act unilaterally. The hospital attorney quickly rejected unilateral action from a legal perspective. The
foster father interpreted the lawyer's rejection of unilateral action
as "an act of God." 3
The ethics meeting had failed to produce any consensus. The
physicians would again attempt to wean Rena from the respirator.
About two weeks later, the attempt, to the surprise of the medical
staff, succeeded; Rena breathed on her own. The hospital attorney
was "dumbstruck;" Dr. Pollack had apparently been proven wrong.
What, then, would a court say? A nurse responded negatively to
that the
the suggestion that a "miracle" had occurred, complaining
4
personnel.3
medical
the
of
work
the
slighted
statement
Baby Rena eventually deteriorated again. A consulting physician recommended that Rena be allowed to die "with decency and
comfort."3 5 Pollack summoned the foster parents, and met with
them and a Christian physician they seemed to trust. Pollack
urged that all efforts to keep Rena alive cease; he wanted Rena to
die in the arms of a caring person, apart from "medications infus3 t
ing ... her and a machine pumping air in and out of her chest."
The parents refused. The father told the Christian physician that
"[flaith must be illustrated by action .... True rewards go to the
Id.
Id.
31 Pollack, supra note 6, at 303.
32 Part II, supra note 6, at A6.
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 Id.
29
30
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'doers of the word,' not just those who said they believed." 7 On
the way out, the father expressed to a nurse that Rena would get
better.
That afternoon, Rena died, despite the respirators and CPR.
The Christian physician 8informed the foster mother by telephone;
3
she seemed "stunned."
II.

A CoNFLICT OF RELIGIONS?: UNDERSTANDING THE
BABY RENA CASE

Dr. Murray Pollack later described Rena's foster parents as
possessing "very strong fundamentalist religious beliefs." 39 According to Pollack, the parents "held steadfast to the belief that every
possible moment of existence should be viewed as an opportunity
for God to work a miracle. Their vision of the miracle was that it
would not only save Baby Rena, but also serve to convert some of
the staff to their beliefs."' The parents, according to Pollack,
"seemed to have abandoned her pain to visions of miracles."4"
Analysis of the religious beliefs of the couple suggests that the
couple were motivated, from the outset of their intervention, by
the hope for a miracle. The parents probably never viewed themselves as providing love and care for a dying child. Instead, they
apparently viewed themselves as engaged in a kind of spiritual warfare that could employ prayer and faith to produce a miraculous
healing. The parents may have specifically believed that whether
Rena was healed depended, primarily, on whether the parents, or
the parents and others involved in Rena's care, would believe that
Rena could be healed. They may have felt a religious obligation to
believe and confess that such healing would occur, regardless of
what the physical symptoms showed. For example, one influential
religious teacher of the "Word of Faith" movement urges:
"Confession always goes ahead of healing. Don't watch symptoms-watch the Word; and be sure that your confession is bold
and vigorous. Don't listen to people. Act on the Word. Be a
doer of the Word. It is God speaking. You are healed. The
listen to the senses. Give the Word its
Word says you are. Don't
42
place. God cannot lie."
37 Id.

at A7.

38 Id.
39
40

Pollack, supra note 6, at 303.
Id.

41 Id.
42

D.R. MCCONNELL, A Dw
(1943)).

THE HEALER

w'rr

GOSPEL

152 (1988) (quoting E.W.

KENYON, JESUS
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Conventional Christianity interprets the Biblical admonition
to be a "doer of the Word" as an admonition to obey, rather than
merely hear, the commands of God.4" By contrast, the Word of
Faith movement teaches that "doers of the Word" claim the healing (or wealth) that God has (allegedly) promised. Thus, when the
parents refused the physician's request to let Rena die in their
arms, and the father stated that true rewards go to "doers" of the
Word, he was probably referring to the couple's constancy in believing in a miraculous healing, despite the contrary physical evidence, rather than referring to Biblical admonitions to care for
orphans. Moreover, it appears that some in the Word of Faith
movement have emphasized that the healing of very young children depends on the parents claiming such healing on the child's
behalf, despite contrary medical evidence.'
There are several indications that Rena's foster parents were
influenced, whether directly or indirectly, by Word of Faith theology. First, the church they attended, and whose pastor assisted
them, is a "full gospel" church. Such churches generally emphasize miraculous "gifts of the spirit" such as speaking in tongues,
prophecy, and healing; some of these churches embrace the Word
of Faith view that God intends all believers to be healthy, if they will
only "claim" such health. Second, the parents' statements suggest
acceptance of the anthropology taught by Word of Faith teachers.
Thus, the father's division of the human being into body, soul, and
spirit, his belief that Rena's illness was a physical manifestation of
"spirits of infirmity," and his apparent belief that an exercise of
faith in the realm of spirit could overcome both the physical disease and these "spirits of infirmity," echoes Word of Faith teach43

See James 1:22-25.

44 See MCCONNELL, supra note 42, at 158 (quoting FRED PRICE, EVER INCREASING

3 (1980)). Fred Price is a contemporary, prominent Word of Faith
preacher and "founder of the 14 thousand member Crenshaw Christian Center of
Inglewood, California." MCCONNELL, supra note 42, at 4. McConnell noted:
In response to the question of why children sometimes die or are born
dead, Price states: "Children that are born dead had no control over
their life, but their parents had that control. However, if the parents do
not know the Word of God and to claim their rights in Christ, the child
suffers the loss."
Id. at 158 (quoting PRICE, supra, at 3).
Similarly, Word of Faith teacher Hobart Freeman allegedly blamed "the death of
his grandson on the lack of faith of his son-in-law." See HANK HANEGRAAFF, CHI-STIANrry IN CRISIS 238 (1993) (citing BRuCE BARRON, THE HEALTH AND WEALTH GOSPEL 1434 (1987)). One couple grieving a stillborn baby was told that their baby died as a
result of the couple's sin of allowing " 'fear to set in and... [not having] enough faith
to believe the baby could be risen from the dead.'" HANEGRAAFF, supra, at 263.
FAITH MESSENGER
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ings. The Word of Faith movement teaches that each person is a
spiritual being who possesses a soul and lives within a body.4" All
sickness is seen as a physical manifestation of a spiritual condition,
and thus can be overcome by spiritual means.' Thus, the most
prominent contemporary Word of Faith leader, Kenneth Hagin,
has described how he healed a young girl of cancer in the left lung
by casting out an evil spirit:
"Suddenly ...the Spirit of God enveloped me like a cloud....
This young girl and I were standing in the midst of the white
cloud. As I looked at her I saw fastened to the outside of her
body, over her left lung, an evil'4 7spirit, or an imp. He looked
very similar to a small monkey."
Similarly, Robert Tilton, another Word of Faith teacher, vigorously defended his television audience from the "spirits of
infirmity:"
"Satan, you demonic spirits of AIDS, and AIDS virus-I bind
you! You demon-spirits of cancer, arthritis, infection, migraine
head-aches, pain-come out of that body! Come out of that
child! Come out of that man. ... Satan, I bind you! You foul
demon-spirits of sickness and disease. Infirmities in the inner
ear and the lungs and the back. You demon-spirits of arthritis,
sickness, and disease. You tormenting infirm-spirits in the stomach. Satan, I bind you!"48
The time that Rena's foster parents spent praying for Rena,
often with their pastor, may have been sessions of both battling the
"spirits of infirmity" associated with the AIDS virus, and of claiming
healing on behalf of Rena. They may have come to believe, as
some Word of Faith teachers espouse, that healing had already occurred on the spiritual level, and that the failure of this to be consistently manifested medically was a demonic test of faith.
The Word of Faith movement is not consistent regarding medical care; it tends to deprecate medical care, and suggests that
those with greater faith will forego it, but does not necessarily, like
Christian Science, forbid it.49 Rena's parents presented an interesting variation. Rather than seeking to prove their faith in healing
through avoidance of conventional medical care, they sought maximum medical care, in the face of a grim prognosis, to demonstrate
45 See MCCONNELL, supra note 42, at 123.
46 Id. at 150.
47 HANEGRAAFF, supra note 44, at 256 (quoting KI'NETH E.
VISIONs 65 (1972)).
48 Id. at 257.
49 See MCCONNELL, supra note 42, at 154-55.
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their faith that God could (or would) perform a miracle. America
is a country of unusual religious variation, created by a constant
interaction and competition among differing religious teachings.
The parents appear not to have been Word of Faith purists, but
apparently were influenced by the belief that God performs miracles for those who exercise sufficient faith. 50 The parents apparently combined Word of Faith emphases with more traditionalist
Christian philosophy, which emphasizes that only God, as the giver
of life, should take life. They seemed to believe, contrary to many
traditionalist Christians, that turning off the respirator and letting
Rena die would be "taking" life.
Initially, the conflict between the foster parents and Dr. Pollack can be described as a conflict between a religious belief emphasizing miraculous healing and the scientific and common sense
assumptions that "the regularities of the physical world consistently
apply."5 1 Thus, the Baby Rena case appears to exemplify Greenawalt's concern with conflicts between scientific and religious interpretations of facts. From other perspectives, however, the Baby
Rena case can be seen as a conflict between various religious
perspectives.
Many mainstream religious groups believe in miracles; they
simply do not, as the Roman Catholic hospital chaplain aptly described it, believe that God requires ventilators to perform a miracle. 52 The foster parents' religious views of miracles could be seen
as conflicting with religious teachings that do not require patients
or their families to expect, or act upon the expectation of, a miracle. The more conventional belief that God may, if He wills, per50 It is probably not unusual for different "full gospel" or "pentecostal" churches,
and individuals, to be influenced by, but not be full adherents of, Word of Faith
teaching. This is particularly true because the pentecostal movement has long emphasized miraculous healing and most contemporary Word of Faith teachers would
be broadly associated with the pentecostal movement. At the same time, some contemporary pentecostals have vigorously argued that the Word of Faith movement is
heretical, and have sought to distinguish classical pentecostalism from Word of Faith
teaching. The pentecostal movement as a whole, however, has yet to dearly repudiate
the Word of Faith movement. In this confusing situation, it is not surprising that
pentecostal or "full gospel" Christians selectively incorporate and adapt Word of Faith
teaching in various ways.
An additional indication that the foster parents and their pastor were not Word
of Faith purists is found in their reaction to Rena's death. The parents, although
initially surprised, in time were able to state that God's will had been done. By contrast, Word of Faith purists tend to blame failures of healing on a lack of faith, and
thus blame the parents for the deaths of their children; some go so far as to attempt
resurrections.
51 GREENAWALT, supra note 2, at 205.
52

Part II, supra note 6, at A6.
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form a miraculous healing, is easily accommodated because it does
not demand a different medical treatment. Few would deny parents the opportunity to pray by the bedside of an apparently dying
child in the hope that God may heal, so long as no alteration of
conventional medical care is required. Thus, the Baby Rena case
could be seen as involving a conflict between different religious
beliefs about the nature of miraculous healing, rather than a conflict about whether such healing ever occurs.
In addition, it is not clear that miracles can be scientifically
excluded; science perhaps is about the regularities of the universe,
rather than about the possibility of divine overruling of the (divinely-sanctioned) regularities. Arguably, the view that miracles
cannot happen is a religious perspective, just as the assertion that
God does not exist is a scientifically insupportable religious belief.
Similarly, the decision, in a certain situation, to make medical determinations based upon the physically-discernible regularities of
the universe, rather than upon an alleged revelation of a divine will
to miraculously heal, is existentially a religious choice.
The latter point may be overly exaggerated, as it makes all
choices "religious."5 3 At least some choices, however, may as a matter of definition or experience generally implicate religion.
Thus, Dr. Pollack's presentation to the ethics committee concluded that Rena was so sedated that "there's not much purpose in
living."54 Both Pollack's conclusion, and the forum in which it was
presented, suggest that more than bare scientific facts were involved. Indeed, the hospital attorney questioned whether "a doctor was entitled to make such a quality-of-life determination." 5
Questions about our "purpose in living," and more broadly about
death and dying, are either inherently religious, or at least raise
religious issues for significant numbers of individuals. It has been
commonly recognized that the term "medical futility" often includes both the prediction that a certain treatment will have no
physiological effect, and the conclusion that a certain physiological
effect, such as continued life, is not, in some broader sense, "beneficial."56 It appears that Dr. Pollack ventured beyond the strictly
physiological meaning of futility to make recommendations based
53 On the other hand, the view of all choices as religious is itself consonant with
those religions that view the religious believer as owing all that she does and is to God.
The decision to view some choices as religious, and others as not, is therefore itself
not religiously "neutral."
54 Part II, supra note 6, at A6.

55 Id.
56

See, e.g., StuartJ. Youngner, Who Defines Futility?,260JAMA 2094, 2094 (1988).
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upon the latter, broader, meaning of futility. This latter sense of
medical "futility" arguably implicates ethical and religious questions about both the purposes of human life and about death and
dying, topics about which physicians arguably have no special exa specifpertise. Thus, it appears that Dr. Pollack, while not stating
57
ically religious thesis, ventured into a religious area.
It is significant whether the foster parents are viewed as conflicting with a common language of science and rationality, or
whether they are described as engaged in a conflict with differing
religious beliefs. In a medical setting, the scientific is normative
and religion can easily become an aberration that may or may not
be accommodated. Normally, one loses rather than gains power by
claiming to be acting out of religious beliefs in a medical setting; to
acknowledge acting out of religion is to acknowledge stepping
away from the discourse and methodology that defines the common enterprise of medicine. Thus, it is not surprising that Dr. Pollack, even while addressing questions of ethics implicating the
purposes of life, employed medical, rather than religious, discourse. In this way, his discourse would remain normative, while
the foster parents' would be anomalous. By contrast, if Dr. Pollack
had defined his disagreement with the foster parents as emanating
from conflicting religious perspectives, he would have placed himself on equally slippery footing with the foster parents. Why should
Pollack's religious views concerning the worthiness of life trump
the religious views of the parents?
A physician could have, on any number of religious grounds,
wished to remove Rena from the ventilator. A physician could
have believed that God commands compassion for those suffering
and dying, and could have viewed the continued treatment as
cruel; a physician could have viewed the ventilator as interfering
with a "natural" process of dying ordained by God; a physician
could have viewed keeping Rena alive to enable a miracle as representing a lack of faith in God's power, or as a sinful attempt to
manipulate God.5" A physician might even claim a certain measure
57 Pollack later admitted a distinction between the moral and medical realm, in
regard to life-and-death decisions, although he did not specifically link religion and

morals. See Pollack, supra note 6, at 304.
58 One of the physicians in the intensive care staff did criticize the foster parents in
religious terms, but it appears that he shared his views solely with the staff, and never
voiced them to the foster parents. "'I have problems with people who believe in God
but not strongly enough to let God make the decisions,' said Alan Fields, a physician.
The miracle the parents were seeking, he said, was a resurrection. 'I would point out
that the one case of resurrection was done without a ventilator.'" Part II, supra note
6, at A6. By contrast, the parents seemed to believe that removing the ventilator
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of expertise on the application of religious principles to death and
dying, for the process of watching and treating many ill and dying
patients would allow a religiously-orientated physician to refine his
or her religious views on the subject. As a practical matter, however, a physician religiously engaging his or her patients risks casting aside his or her normative mantle as a representative of the
medical profession, with a corollary loss of authority.
The irony here is that the normative guards its authority by
portraying itself as nonreligious, and yet may itself be highly religious. One way to test this thesis is to explore the question of
whether medical ethics in the broad sense, and the futility doctrine
specifically, is historically intertwined with religion.
III.

Tim HiPPocRATic CoRpus, MEDICAL

ETHICS,

AND MEDICAL FuTILITY

The Hippocratic Corpus, the body of writings attributed to
Hippocrates, has played a leading role in the historical development of medical ethics.59 The leading ethical statement within this
corpus has been the Hippocratic Oath.60 The prestige of the Oath
has stemmed at least in part from the eminence of Hippocrates,
the Greek physician frequently regarded as the "Father of
Medicine."61

The Hippocratic Oath has sometimes been viewed as containing objectively valid and virtually universally accepted guidelines
would constitute a sinful seizing of God's authority. See id. The hospital's chaplain, a
Roman Catholic Sister, also believed that God didn't need a ventilator to perform a
miracle, but decided "it would be unfair to challenge the foster father, who spoke
with such authority and conviction." Id. Thus, it appears that the religious dialogue
about Baby Rena remained one-sided, with the foster family's religious discourse answered by medical discourse, giving the apparently erroneous impression that those at
the hospital possessed no relevant religious views.
59 See geeraUyTHE MEDICAL WORS OF HippocRATEs (John Chadwick & W.N. Mann
trans., 1950). It remains controversial which works of the corpus were written by Hippocrates himself, which were authored by others writing within the "Hippocratic tradition," and which were written by those outside of the Hippocratic tradition who
nonetheless employed his name.
60 The Greek text and a translation of the Hippocratic Oath can be found in LuDWIG EDELSTEIN, THE HippocRATic OATH 2-3 (1943) (No. 1, Supplements to the Bulletin of the History of Medicine). On the broad influence of the Oath, see id. at vii, 4,
63. See also Ben A. Rich, Postmodern Medicine: Deconstructing the HippocraticOath, 65 U.
COLO. L. REv. 77, 86 n.48 (1993) (quoting Edmund D. Pellegrino, Toward an Expanded Medical Ethics: The HippocraticEthic Revisited in IN SEARCH OF THE MODERN
HPi'ocRATEs 45 (Roger J. Bulger ed., 1987)). For a judicial acknowledgment of the
influence of the Oath, see Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 130-31 (1973).
61 See, e.g., Roe, 410 U.S. at 130-31 (noting the historical significance of Hippocrates as "the Father of Medicine" in the context of the Oath bearing his name).
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for medical practice.6" It is therefore surprising to find, upon even
a cursory examination, that the Oath appears to be a particularistic
religious document, rather than an analytic presentation of natural
law, Greek philosophy, or secular ethics. The Oath is sworn to
"Apollo Physician and Asclepias and Hygieia and Panaceia and all
the gods and goddesses, making them my witness," and thus constitutes a religious oath.6" The specific precepts are undergirded by
the physician's promise to guard his life and art "in purity and holiness."6 4 The Oath ends with an invocation of blessings for fulfill6
ment of the Oath, and cursings for transgression. 1
Initially, then, it would appear that the most prominent historical statement of medical ethics was in the form of a religious oath
or covenant. Modern scholarship undergirds this impression of
the Oath as a religious document. Many contemporary writers appear to accept the thesis of Ludwig Edelstein, published in 1943,
that the Oath was not authored by Hippocrates, but instead was a
"Pythagorean document" authored in the fourth century B.C. 66
Edelstein based this conclusion largely upon the Oath's prohibition of assisting suicide or abortion; these strict proscriptions, Edelstein argued, were embraced by the Pythagoreans but rejected by
virtually all other Greeks. 67 Edelstein argued that the Oath only
became truly popular upon the rise of Christianity in the ancient
world:
Pythagoreanism seemed to bridge the gulf between heathendom and the new belief. Christianity found itself in agreement
with the principles of Pythagorean ethics, its concepts of holiness and purity, justice and forbearance. The Pythagorean god
who forbade suicide to men, his creatures, was also the God of
the Jews and the Christians.... As time went on, the Hippocratic Oath became the nucleus of all medical ethics. In all
countries, in all epochs in which monotheism, in its purely religious or in its more secularized form, was the accepted creed,
the Hippocratic Oath was applauded as the embodiment of
truth.

68

Justice Blackmun's majority opinion in Roe v. Wade accepted
the views of Ludwig Edelstein that the Oath represented the views
of the ancient Pythagoreans, and became popular because of the
62 EDELSTEIN,
63 Id. at 3.
64 Id.
65 Id.

66 Id. at
67
68

supra note 60, at 4.

54, 60.

Id. at 6-18.

Id. at 63-64 (footnote omitted).
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correspondences between Pythagorean and Christian ethics.6 9
Blackmun quoted with approval Edelstein's conclusion that the
Oath is "'a Pythagorean manifesto and not the expression of an
70
absolute standard of medical conduct.'"
Pythagoras lived from approximately 570 B.C. to 495 B.C. .71
He is often regarded as a Pre-Socratic philosopher, and the school
of philosophy that bears his name significantly influenced Plato.72
Pythagoras, however, was preeminently a "major religious teacher
and reformer ... [who] founded a religious order devoted to his
teachings. "7 The essence of the Pythagorean religion, according
to some commentators, was an attempt to escape from the cycles of
reincarnation and achieve full assimilation to the divine; the rigorous ethic of the Pythagorean life was part of a process of religious
purification. Pythagorean mathematics and philosophy were religious activities contributing to this process of purification, or
"catharsis."71
If the Hippocratic Oath is a "Pythagorean manifesto," then the
Oath's ethical precepts are part of a broader process of religious
purification intended to remove adherents from the cycle of reincarnation. The proscription against assisting suicide was apparently based on the secret teaching that "suicide was a sin against
god who had allocated to man his position in life,"7 5 or more
broadly, that "men are not their own masters but belong to the
gods." 76 The proscription against abortion was based on the Pythagorean belief that "the embryo was an animate being from the
moment of conception."7 7 Indeed, the Pythagoreans believed that
the soul "migrates into other kinds of animals.., and ...that one
must regard all living things as kindred."78 Thus, it appears that
the Pythagoreans abstained from animal flesh, and even from
beans, as kindred souls lived within animal bodies, and beans were
69 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 131-32 (1973).
70 Id. at 132.
71 See MERRILJL RING, BEGINNING WTrH THE PRE-SocRATICS 43 (1987).

72 See W.T. JONES, THE CLASSICAL MIND 39 (2d ed. 1970); THE PYrHAGOREAN

SOURCEBOOK AND LIBRARY 19 (Kenneth S. Guthrie trans., 1987) (introduction). It
may be useful to note the warning here of W.K.C. Guthrie, that the "history of Pythagoreanism is perhaps the most controversial subject in all Greek philosophy, and much
about it must remain obscure." W.K.C. GuTrHIUE, A HISTORY OF GREEK PHILOSOPHY

146 (1971) (footnote omitted).
73 RING, supra note 71, at 42.
74 Id. at 45-60; JoNs, supra note 72, at 32-34; GUTHRIE, supra note 72, at 199.
75 EDELSTEIN, supra note 60, at 15.
76 GurrHRI,
supra note 72, at 167.
77 EDELSTEIN, supra note 60, at 16.
78 GruTmIE, supra note 72, at 186 (quotation omitted).
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a "mysterious embodiment of the universal life spirit." 79 Further,
the Pythagoreans possessed, for the ancient world, an unusually
rigorous sexual ethic, which proscribed sexual relations outside of
marriage and held marital intercourse "justifiable only for the purpose of producing offspring.""° Under these circumstances, it is
hardly surprising that the physician's covenant to "guard my life
and my art .... [i] n purity and holiness," follows immediately after
the covenant not to assist suicide or abortion. The Pythagorean
way of life, and its path of assimilation into the divine, required a
reverence for life.
It is easy to see how a Pythagorean ethical document could
have been approved by the Church Fathers, despite the apparent
similarities between Pythagorean beliefs and those of Indian and
other Eastern religions."' The ancient world generally approved
not only abortion and suicide, but also infanticide; the sexual ethics of the ancient world were often quite relaxed, frequently accepting and even glorifying extramarital relations and
homosexuality. 2 An ethical document espousing reverence for
life, a strict sexual ethic,8 3 and the implication that human beings
owe their lives and positions to divine providence, must have
seemed like a rare jewel among the ancients, despite its explicit
references to the pagan gods. Christian adoption of the Hippocratic Oath can be seen as a part of a broader program of preserving (and altering) the best wisdom from the ancient pagan world.
If Edelstein is even partially correct about the Hippocratic
Oath, then the roots of medical ethics are explicitly religious: first
Pythagorean, and later, monotheistic. Medical ethics, as it has existed for more than two millennia, apparently is rooted in religion,
rather than in philosophy or science. Edelstein wrote when the
Oath's bans on abortion and suicide were generally accepted; thus
his work can be viewed as a sort of gentle deconstruction of the
Oath. 4 Justice Blackmun turned this deconstruction to his own
purposes, but left many questions unanswered. If the Oath had
79
80
81
gion

Id. at 187; see also id. at 187-91.
EDELSTEIN, supra note 60, at 17.
See RING, supra note 71, at 48 (noting the similarity between Pythagorean reliand Indian, Chinese, and Persian religious systems); GutrHi,
supra note 72, at

251-56 (analyzing alleged similarities).
82 See EDELSTEIN, supra note 60, at 10-18, 32-35.
83 The Hippocratic Oath also prohibits "sexual relations with both female and
male persons, be they free or slaves" when visiting houses for the benefit of the sick.
See EDELSTEIN, supra note 60, at 3. Edelstein argues that this prohibition was representative of the strict Pythagorean sexual ethic. See id. at 32-35.
84 See Rich, supranote 60, at 88. As Rich notes, "[f] rom a strictly historical perspec-
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been a Christian document for -nearly two millennia, then the
abandonment of the Oath's standards logically would represent a
turn away from Christianity. A turn away from Christianity, however, generally is a turn toward something else. Is abandonment of
the Oath's standards a turn toward the majority religion of the ancient world, the paganism that accepted not only abortion, but also
infanticide? Or would it be possible to turn away from the Christian standards of the Oath toward a religiously-neutral, "scientific,"
or "secular," standard, despite a history of more than two millennia
of religious domination of medical ethics? Indeed, is there even
any such thing as a "scientific" or "religiously-neutral" bioethics,
given the nature of the questions at issue?
These questions are sharpened by examination of another important text of the Hippocratic Corpus, the statement, from "The
Art," on medical futility.8 5 "The Art" defines medicine as "the complete removal of the distress of the sick, the alleviation of the more
violent diseases and the refusal to undertake to cure cases in which
the disease has already won the mastery, knowing that everything is
not possible to medicine."' The purpose of the treatise containing this definition is to defend the efficacy of medicine. The admonition to refuse cases "in which the disease has already won the
mastery" places such cases outside the province of medicine, allowing the treatise to assert that "the efficacy of the science is better demonstrated when it succeeds in relieving an internal malady
than if the cure of an apparently hopeless case should be attempted."8 7 The refusal of hopeless cases thus appears partially
grounded in the reputational self-interest of physicians. More fundamentally, however, the text asserts that a science or art88 contains
within itself inherent limitations. "A man who thinks that a science
can perform what is outside its province, or that nature can accomplish unnatural things, is guilty of ignorance more akin to madness
than to lack of learning. Our practice is limited by the instruments
tive on the authenticity of the Oath as a work of the physician Hippocrates, Professor
Edelstein performed a type of deconstruction nearly fifty years ago." Id.
supra note 59, at 81-89. This edition
85 See TiH MEDICAL WORKS OF HEPPocRATEs,
translates the tide as "The Science of Medicine," even though (as it acknowledges)
the title has often been translated as "The Art." I use the title "The Art" in the text
because it is more likely to be familiar to the reader.
86
87

Id. at 82.
Id. at 88.

88 I use the term "art" or "science" interchangeably, due to the apparent disagreement among translators as to which term best conveys the intent of the original.
Thus, the translation cited herein uses the term science because "it is the writer's
main contention that Medicine is an exact science, not an undefinable art." Id. at 81.
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made available by Nature or by Art." 9 This latter statement is apparently linked to the broader theory of. Hippocratic medicine,
and to some degree of Greek thought, that a restoration of health
is achieved by restoring a "natural" balance among four bodily substances, or humors.9 0 Thus, the Hippocratic Precepts urged physicians to preserve nature, "not ... to alter it."9 1
The positive view of the natural condition of human beings,
the understanding of that positive natural condition as a harmonious balance of differing substances, and the understanding of
medicine as an art (or science) by which such natural balance can
be restored, thus form the context for the Hippocratic concept of
medical futility. Nature, and the arts or science that seek to preserve nature, each contain inherent limitations, and it is hubris, or
excessive pride, to seek to go beyond such inherent limitations.9 2
Even the supposedly Pythagorean Hippocratic Oath, with its preference for dietetics over pharmacology and its disdain for surgery,
broadly reflects the ancient Greek emphasis on overcoming disease
by restoring a natural balance of bodily substances.9"
It is possible to contrast this broadly Greek approach to a
more Baconian science, which seeks to conquer, rather than restore, nature.9 4 The latter Baconian approach to nature can further be grounded in a certain interpretation of the first chapter of
Genesis, which views humankind as possessing "dominion" over nature.9 5 The Christian doctrine of the Fall provides a further con89 Id. at 85.

90 See Nancy S. Jecker, Knowing When to Stop: The Limits of Medicine, HASTINGS
May-June 1991, at 5.
91 Id. (quoting Hippocrates, Precepts, in ETmICS IN MEDICINE: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES AND CONTEMPORARY CONCERNS 6 (S.J. Reiser et al. eds., 1977)).
92 Jecker, supra note 90, at 5.
93 See EDELSTEIN, supra note 60, at 3, 18-32 (providing text of Oath and Edelstein's
analysis of the Oath's division of medicine into dietetics, pharmacology, and surgery).
94 SeeJecker, supra note 90, at 6.
95 See Genesis 1:26-28. It has been stated that Bacon's The Great Instaurationinvolved
'a comprehensive plan to reorganize the sciences and to restore man to that mastery
over nature that he was conceived to have lost by the fall of Adam.' 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA
BarryicA 563 (15th ed. 1982). This broad hope appears implicit in the prayer by
which Bacon closed his Plan of the Work, particularly if one recalls that to work 'by the
sweat of your brow' is a part of the curse occasioned by Adam's fall:
Therefore do thou, 0 Father, who gavest the visible light as the first
fruits of creation, and didst breathe into the face of man the intellectual
light as the crown and consummation thereof, guard and protect this
work, which coming from thy goodness returneth to thy glory. Thou
when thou turnest to look upon the works which thy hands had made,
sawest that all was very good, and didst rest from thy labours. But man,
when he turned to look upon the work which his hands had made, saw
that all was vanity and vexation of spirit, and could find no rest therein.
CENTER REP.
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trast to the Greek search for a harmonious balance in nature.
Genesis records God's proclamation that the ground, because of
Adam's sin, is "cursed."9 6 Paul teaches in the New Testament that
the creation is in "bondage to decay."9 7 The Christian doctrine of
the Fall acknowledges that the creation is good, 9 but because of
the Fall has been subject to frustration and decay. There is, in
Christian terms, no way to go back to the Garden, to the original
goodness and innocence of the created order; the way of redemption, for both humankind and the creation, lies ahead and includes an active stewardship of a decaying nature that contains
within itself the curse of frustration and death. 99 Simply as a matter of imagery, it may be significant that the Christian scriptures
begin with humankind in a garden, 10 0 and end with a vision of the
city of god.'
Nancy Jecker has claimed that modem medicine, influenced
by the Baconian scientific tradition, fails to observe the proper limits of medicine. 10 2 Jecker calls for a return to the Hippocratic doctrine of medical futility, and the broader Greek concept of
medicine as seeking (within the inherent limits of its art and its
subject) to restore nature. 0l' Several responses to Jecker's argument could be elaborated. First, Jecker may overstate the contrast
between Hippocratic and Baconian medicine. Jecker emphasizes
Bacon's empiricism as an application of his desire to dominate and
plunder nature. Yet, it is precisely Hippocrates's apparent empiricism and his ability, despite his limiting theoretical framework, to
accurately describe the symptoms of various diseases, that has endeared him to generations of physicians. Indeed, some view Hippocrates's contribution as primarily that of freeing medicine from
Wherefore if we labor in thy works with the sweat of our brows thou wilt
make us partakers of thy vision and thy sabbath. Humbly we pray that
this mind may be steadfast in us, and that through these our hands, and
the hands of others to whom thou shalt give the same spirit, thou wilt
vouchsafe to endow the human family with new mercies.
FRANCIS BACON, The Plan of the Work, The Great Instauration (1620), reprinted in SELEcTED WRITINGS 451 (Modem Library ed. 1955).

Genesis 3:17.
See Romans 8:21.
98 See, e.g., Genesis 1:31 ("God saw all that he had made, and indeed it was very
good.").
99 For a contemporary explication of the meaning of Christian theological concepts such as creation, the Fall, and redemption, see JOHN PAUL II, CROSSING THE
THRESHOLD OF HOPE (Jenny McPhee & Martha McPhee trans., 1994).
100 See Genesis 2:15.
101 See Revelation 21.
102 SeeJecker, supra note 90, at 6-8.
103 See id. at 7-8.
96
97
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the superstitions of religion, through the use of empirical observation.1" 4 Thus, both Bacon and Hippocrates methodologically emphasized careful observation, despite the differences between
ancient Greek and modern Christian world views.
Second, Jecker admits that during the early nineteenth century, when medicine was more Hippocratic and Greek, it lacked a
"'substantial body of usable scientific knowledge,'"1" 5 and that such
knowledge was developed through an identification of medicine
with a more Baconian scientific medicine.10 6 No one, presumably,
wants to reject the fruit of modem scientific medicine and go back
to the days of leeches; in this sense, the Baconian science that
Jecker is critiquing appears eminently more usable and successful
than the Hippocratic medicine she recommends. Jecker fails to
clearly articulate the appropriate places for the contrasting Hippocratic and Baconian approaches, or to explain why a successful Baconian medical methodology should be guided by a Hippocratic
ethic.
In the end, Jecker may be simply saying that medicine, as a
human enterprise whose ultimate purpose is to improve human
life, must be guided by human, rather than intrinsically scientific,
values. Many have made the similar point that medical futility includes questions of values that are severable from the narrower,
empirical question of whether a certain treatment will have any
medical impact.lO Jecker's work reminds us that values are often
rooted in a broader world view; world views, of course, are often
comprehensive enough to be properly called "religious." Jecker
further implies that differing medical methodologies imply contrasting world views or values. From this perspective, it can be argued that the ordinary practice of medicine implies a particular
range of world views or religions? ° s
104 See, e.g., FotisJ. Mitsis, Hippocratesin the Golden Age, 58J. AM. C. DENTISTS 26, 2830 (1991); Dickinson W. Richards, Hippocratesand History: The Arrogance of Humanism,
printed in HippocRATEs REviSITED 14, 17-20, 23 (Roger J. Bulger ed., 1973).
105 SeeJecker, supranote 90, at 6 (quoting W.G. RoTHSrEIN, AMERICAN PHYSICIANS IN
THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 27 (1972)).
106 Id.
107 See, e.g., Youngner, supra note 56, at 2094-95.
108 Thus, Jecker speaks of the "values inherent in medicine." Jecker, supra note 90,
at 7. Jecker may mean simply that particular medical practices are not value-free, but
necessarily imply a set of values; more provocatively, she may be stating that medicine
of necessity, because of the nature of the art and its subject, properly implies the
Greek values represented by the Hippocratic doctrine of medical futility.
For an argument that the regular practices of law professors in the classroom
imply certain religious views, see Roger Crampton, Beyond The Ordinary Religion, 37 J.
LEc.AL EDUC. 509, 509-18 (1987).
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Both Jecker and Justice Blackmun call us back to the ancient

world. Jecker urges a return to the Greek concept of medical futility grounded in a world view emphasizing the harmonious balance
of nature, while Justice Blackmun implicitly endorses the ancient
world's acceptance of abortion. Both Jecker and Blackmun implicitly reject a theistic medical ethics. Jecker, although she does not
discuss Bacon's religion, could be seen as implicitly rejecting the
theistic view of human nature that undergirded Bacon's concept of
human dominion over nature; Blackmun can be seen as implicitly
rejecting the historic Christian view of abortion and the sanctity of
human life that made the Pythagorean Hippocratic Oath normative for almost two millennia.
These contrasts between ancient Greek thought and Christianity may be overstated. Many theists would emphasize the commonalities that human beings have with other animals as fellow
creations of God ("creatures"), and would emphasize the human
obligation to protect, rather than plunder or dominate nature. 1
Some Christians are morally comfortable with elective abortion,
even if the predominate traditions of the church over two millennia teach otherwise. A greater number of Christians accept a
broad decriminalization of abortion, despite their moral abhorrence or ambivalence regarding elective abortion.
Nonetheless, it is instructive that exploration of the Hippocratic tradition of medical ethics, whether the subject be abortion,
suicide, or medical futility, frequently becomes intertwined with
contrasts between various world views, most or all of which are
clearly religious. It is also instructive that these various historical
world views, whether ancient Greek, pagan, Pythagorean, or theistic, emerge in proposals or discussions of changes in medical ethics.
Thus, changes in medical ethics frequently imply steps toward or
away from various competing (religious) world views.
History and religion thus seem inescapable in contemporary
discussions of medical ethics. This should not be surprising, as it
confirms the more theoretical point that questions of medical ethics, by implicating questions relating to the significance of human
life and death, are inherently religious. Thus, whatever systems or
particular rules of medical ethics are adopted by the medical profession through rule, custom, or practice, will necessarily concur

109 Saint Francis of Assisi, for example, is generally associated with a Christian per-

spective that views animals as our "brothers and sisters." See, e.g.,
FRANcis oF Assisi 517-20, 533-42 (Helen Moak trans. 1992).

ARNALDO FORTINI,
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with some religious viewpoints and differ with others. In this sense,
at a minimum, medical ethics can never be religiously "neutral."
'Ironically, Establishment Clause doctrine, almost of necessity,
must view the dominate medical ethics as nonreligious, regardless
of the historical (and even contemporary) role of religion in the
creation of such ethics, and regardless of the role of medical ethics
in addressing questions that implicate traditionally religious questions about the significance of life and death. If it is true that historically, and definitionally, medical ethics is concerned with
religious questions, then legally medical ethics cannot be considered
religious. Otherwise, established rules of medical ethics would automatically violate contemporary Establishment Clause doctrine,
which requires that government not favor one religion over another. The courts would be left with the absurdity of invalidating
all legally binding rules of medical ethics. Thus, in regard to medical ethics, the courts are forced to conclude (as they did in regard
to abortion), that mere correspondences between religious views
and legal rules are not sufficient to violate the Establishment
Clause; 110 moreover, the courts will not be inclined to look too
deeply into the question of what produces such
"correspondences."1 1
Thus, legally as well as medically, an authoritative medical ethics will tend, no matter how inwardly religious, and no matter how
influenced by religious presuppositions, to wear a cloak of secularity. This cloak is only removed when there is a desire to discard, or
alter, what is underneath. Thus, it is only when Blackmun wants to
discard a portion of the Hippocratic Oath that he removes the veil
to reveal that it is a particularistic religious document. Even then,
the pretense is maintained that the new rule of medical ethics will
somehow be secular, even if it addresses a subject dominated by
religious thought for over two millennia.
Dr. Pollack, the treating physician of Baby Rena, is therefore
typical when he addresses apparently religious questions concerning the meaning and purpose of his patient's life, and what makes
that life worthwhile, in secular and medical terms, while marginalizing the foster parents as acting from "very strong fundamentalist
religious beliefs." 1 2 If, by contrast, Dr. Pollack said something like,
110 See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 319-20 (1980).
111 For a similar argument regarding euthanasia and the legal definitions of death
and homicide, see David M. Smolin, The Free Exercise Clause, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, and the Right to Active and Passive Euthanasia, 10 IssuEs L. & MED. 3, 4-8, 17,
53-54 (1994).
112 See Pollack, supra note 6, at 303.
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"according to my religion, it is cruel to keep this baby alive, and the
medical profession currently prefers my religion to yours, or at
least gives me the authority to prefer my religion over yours," then
Dr. Pollack would risk losing this authoritative mantle of secularity.
It may be, of course, that Dr. Pollack does not view himself as a
religious person, even when he addresses life and death questions.
Nonetheless, even when he addresses questions traditionally considered within the ambit of religion, or even if he himself acts from
self-consciously religious motivations, it is clear that he must treat
his opinions as medical and secular if he is to maintain his position
of authority.
Dr. Pollack might respond by noting that he did not, in fact,
get his way; aggressive treatment continued until Baby Rena died.
Legally, this occurred primarily because the District of Columbia,
the legal guardian of Baby Rena, did not consent to Dr. Pollack's
plan. In addition, aggressive treatment of Baby Rena apparently
was not so exceptional as to constitute, in itself, medical malpractice or a clear violation of current medical ethics. Thus, Dr. Pollack could not rely upon a clear contemporary consensus of his
profession declaring either that treating Baby Rena was medically
unsound, or that the physician's views, in such cases, always trump
those of the legal guardian. Dr. Pollack was apparently seeking to
expand the authority of physicians by the establishment of the
principle of medical futility, rather than relying on a firmly established rule."' In the end, he was unwilling to take the dramatic
113 The Washington Post article portrays Pollack as an advocate, along with several of
his colleagues, for the view that "in cases where treatment is futile, physicians should
have the authority to decide whether to stop treatment-regardless of a family's
wishes and without having to go to court for approval." Part 1, supra note 6, at Al,
A18. Pollack is further described as suggesting, in regard to Baby Rena, that it might
be possible to withdraw aggressive treatment unilaterally. Part II, supranote 6, at A6.
The article also emphasizes that Pollack had been involved in other cases raising the
issue of medical futility, and that his own views differed from current hospital policy.
Pollack's later analysis of the Baby Rena case, however, appears to show him backing away from the simple claim that physicians should be able to unilaterally withdraw
or withhold futile treatment. Pollack stated:
I could have made a unilateral decision to withdraw or severely limit
care. However, this decision would have crossed the boundaries between a moral and a medical decision, and I believe we should be very
careful before allowing health-care professionals to assume moral as
well as medical responsibilities concerning life-and-death decisions.
Pollack, supra note 6, at 304. Thus, while The Washington Post article described Pollack
as advocating the position that the physician should have the authority to act without
family or court approval, his own later analysis of the situation portrays him both as
seeking a surrogate decision-maker willing to authorize withdrawal of aggressive treatment and as unwilling to act alone despite his failure to find such a surrogate.
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and simple step of acting alone to discontinue aggressive treatment. Whether this constituted a lack of courage, ambivalence
about acting alone in a difficult moral realm, or fear that such a
move would be counterproductive to the establishment of the doctrine of medical futility, can only be answered by Dr. Pollack.114
The relevant point here is that for one seeking to implement a new
rule of medical ethics, as well as for those following well established
paths of medical ethics, it is most strategic to present oneself in the
cloak of a secular, rational, medical actor.
IV.

APPLYING THE RELIGIOUS FREEDOM RESTORATION ACT TO

QUESTIONS OF MEDICAL FuTInY

If the above analysis is correct, then the Establishment Clause
will have little relevance to the doctrine of medical futility in particular, or more broadly to the field of medical ethics. When rules of
medical ethics are enforced or practiced by governmental actors, it
is strategically necessary for those actors to present, apply, and defend those rules in secular, legal, medical categories, and to avoid
religious terminology and discourse. Such terminology can be
viewed positively as an attempt to engage in discourse more accessible to those of varying religions, or more negatively as a dishonest
hiding, in some instances, of religious motivations. As a practical
matter, the field of medical ethics has developed a secular, philosophical terminology that neatly serves to hide the religious nature
of the questions involved. Terminology such as autonomy, equality, and beneficence sounds wonderfully abstract and secular, even
when apparently religious questions relating to the purpose and
meaning of life and death are being debated.
On the other hand, patients or their guardians seeking treatment, or medical care providers seeking not to provide certain
treatments, may wish to ground their claims in the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA)1 15 It is important, at the outset, to
note the risks of such a claim. RFRA primarily assists persons seeking exemptions, based on religious motivations, from secular laws
of general applicability. Such persons are, in a sense, claiming
aberrance based on religion, and seeking to have such religiouslySee supra note 114 for a discussion of Pollack's views.
Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (codified at 42 U.S.CA. § 2000bb (West
Supp. 1994)) [hereinafter RFRA]. For a helpful overview of RFRA, see generally
Thomas C. Berg, What Hath Congress Wrought? An Interpretive Guide to the Religious Free114
115

dom Restoration Act, 39 Va.L. L. REv. 1 (1994). For an analysis of RFRA as applied to
the related medical ethics issues of active and passive euthanasia, see Smolin, supra
note 111.
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motivated aberrance accommodated. The above analysis suggests
the cost, in a medical context, of claiming religious aberrance from
secular rules. Such a claim, at the outset, marginalizes the person
making the claim, and sacrifices any claims to the authority of secular medical ethics, or the general standards of medical practice. It
is as though one said, "I want to act (or fail to act) in a way which
constitutes bad medical practice, because of my religion." A physician making such a RFRA claim thereby loses the benefits of her
authoritative position as a physician, by admitting, in essence, that
what she wants is considered aberrant in her profession, and by
admitting that she possesses a religion so irrational as to drive her
to abandon, in at least this instance, "rational" medical practice.
Such a claim implicitly removes the physician's mantle of authority
for the case in question, and draws into question, in a broader
sense, the physician's entire professional persona and credibility.
Thus, it would seem to be the rare physician who would seek
to invoke RFRA to support a claim of medical futility. Attorneys
are familiar with alternative pleading, but physicians may be uncomfortable claiming that, first, sound medical practice allows a
physician to refuse to treat a certain condition, and alternatively,
that a physician's personal religious beliefs demand an exemption
from sound medical practice. This kind of strategy may be necessary when defending a criminal charge or tort action, but, seemingly, would rarely be used as an initial justification for an action
not yet taken.
Even patients sacrifice some potential authority by invoking
RFRA, and thereby claiming that their religion compels them to
seek a certain treatment regardless of whether it constitutes normal
medical practice. Patients (or their guardians) may first want to
argue that the treatment they seek is, in secular, medical terms,
beneficial, and that legally, patients (or their families) should
make such determinations. Nonetheless, alternative pleading of
RFRA sacrifices little, because patients and their guardians are, at
the outset, disadvantaged in their conflicts with physicians over the
question of what constitutes appropriate medical treatment. Patients also lack any need to maintain future credibility as medical
professionals. Moreover, it can be useful for patients or their representatives to use RFRA (and the Free Exercise Clause) to supplement and support a claim of patient or family autonomy. Thus, for
example, in the Wanglie case, the court accepted the husband as
the legal guardian for his incompetent wife in part based on their
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congruent religious views;' where patients hold strong religious
beliefs, autonomy and family privacy can serve to protect the free
exercise of religion."1
Thus, it seems likely that most RFRA claims, in medical futility
cases, would be made by patients or their representatives seeking
treatment. Such claims, however, face severe legal difficulties.
RFRA only governs infringements of religious liberty by governmental actors; thus, questions of medical futility arising in private
hospitals, and not involving the denial of governmental benefits,
will often be outside the reach of the statute.118
Even where the decision to not treat is somehow attributable
to "state action," it seems likely that courts generally would find
that the failure to provide a particular treatment does not "substantially burden a person's exercise of religion," 19 and thus is not
actionable under RFRA. Where the treatment in question would
not generally be provided under the medical circumstances of the
case, the right of a person who has a religious motivation to be so
treated would seem difficult to establish. In such instances, it
would appear that the religious person is seeking something extra
from the government, based upon his or her religion, and thus is
seeking to be favored, rather than merely accommodated, based
on his or her religion. There is already precedent to support the
an
proposition that the failure of government to fund or1 2 subsidize
0
RFRA.
under
"burden"
a
constitute
not
activity does
See No. PX-91-283 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Hennepin County, July 1, 1991), reprintedin 7
369, 372 (1991).
supra note 111, at 30-36, 51-53.
118 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000bb-1 ("Government shall not substantially burden a person's exercise of religion ... .
116

ISSuEs L. & MED.
117 See Smolin,

119 Id.
120 See Fordham Univ. v. Brown, 856 F. Supp. 684, 696-97 (D.D.C. 1994). The
United States Commerce Department declared an application by Fordham University
for funding of broadcast facilities as "ineligible" because the university's radio station
broadcast a Roman Catholic Mass for one hour each Sunday. The noncommercial
radio station was an affiliate of National Public Radio and American Public Radio,
and broadcast, aside from the weekly Mass, typical public radio programming such as
music, news, and information. The university apparently would have been granted
over $200,000 for broadcast facilities, based on the usual procedures for prioritizing
grant applications, if the government had not imposed a policy of absolutely barring
such grants to stations broadcasting any "sectarian programming." Id. at 689. Fordham was told that it "would receive no funding until the religious service was removed
from" the station's schedule. Id. at 689-90.
The district court granted the government's motion for summaryjudgment. The
court, in rejecting Fordham's RFRA claim, stated that "the challenged regulations do
not burden anyone's free exercise of religion, much less 'substantially burden.' In no
way is a failure to subsidize a 'burden;' WFUV can, and does, broadcast Mass as it
always has." Id. at 697. The court cited Rust v. Sullivan for the proposition that "the
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RFRA claimants seeking government benefits would likely cite
Sherbert v. Verner, which held that the denial of unemployment compensation benefits constituted a burden on the free exercise of religion. 121 RFRA states as its purpose the restoration of "the
122
compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner."
Some of the most important free exercise case law on religious exemptions, from Sherbert to Employment Division v. Smith,123 arose in
the unemployment benefits context. It is therefore important to
examine Sherbertin greater detail, to determine whether unemployment compensation benefits are distinguishable from the provision
of medical services.
In Sherbert, a Seventh Day Adventist was unable to find employment that would not violate her church's proscription of working
on Saturday. South Carolina denied unemployment benefits, holding that Sherbert's failure to accept Saturday employment constituted a failure, without good cause, to accept suitable work. 2 4 The
Court held that this denial of benefits unconstitutionally burdened
Sherbert's free exercise of religion.1 2 5 The Court admitted that
there were no criminal sanctions involved, and that the burden was
"only an indirect result of welfare legislation within the State's general competence to enact."126 However, the denial of benefits
forced Sherbert "to choose between following the precepts of her
religion and forfeiting benefits, on the one hand, and abandoning
one of the precepts of her religion in order to accept work, on the
other hand." 12 71 Moreover, South Carolina law stated that an emSupreme Court recognizes that the failure to fund a protected activity does not constitute a penalty on that activity." Fordham Univ., 856 F. Supp. at 697 n.6 (citing Rust v.
Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 192 (1991)). The court distinguished the university's citation
of Sherbert v. Verner, by noting Fordham's claim that its radio station "is secular and is
not broadcasting to further the Plaintiff's religious beliefs, in contrast to the direct
and obvious exercise of religious beliefs by the plaintiff in Sherbert." Fordham Univ.,
856 F. Supp. at 697 (citing Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963)). Thus, the
court's analysis allowed the government to declare the university ineligible for broadcast facility funding based on the sectarian nature of the weekly Mass, while simultaneously denying the RFRA claim based on the broadly secular nature of the radio
station. This way of escaping Sherbert seems contorted, and uses the broadly secular
nature of the station as an excuse for allowing discrimination against religion and for
seeking to "purify" public radio from even a small amount of religious broadcasting.
Nonetheless, the case illustrates the difficulty of demonstrating that a denial of government benefits constitutes a burden under RFRA.
121 Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 402.
122 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000bb.
123

494 U.S. 872 (1990).

124
125
126
127

See Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 399-401.
Id. at 403.
Id.
Id. at 404.
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ployee who is conscientiously opposed to working on Sunday shall
not be required to work on Sunday. South Carolina further forbade employers from discriminating against employees who conscientiously objected to Sunday employment. 12 The Court's
comparison of Sherbert to the Sunday Sabbatarian, who under
South Carolina law received extensive protection, made the provision of unemployment compensation benefits to Sherbert appear
necessary to produce approximate equal treatment between
religions. 12 9
It is noteworthy that the Court never compared Sherbert to an
individual who refuses to work on Saturday for "secular" reasons,
such as a desire (or need) to spend time with (and care for) a
child. Assuming that the latter person is denied unemployment
benefits, it can appear that the Court's decision favors Sherbert, by
mandating that her "religious" reasons are honored while another's "secular" reasons are not. Indeed, in the context of a state
where Sunday employment is rare, the Court's decision had the
effect of uniquely providing to Saturday Sabbatarians the beneficial
right to demand a two day weekend or receive unemployment
benefits.
For present purposes, we can state that the Sherbert Court
viewed the refusal of a government benefit as a "burden" where it
created a choice or temptation to abandon one's faith, and/or where
the accommodation was necessary to produce a closer equality in
treatment between those of differing religions. It would appear
that neither kind of "burden" would be present when a patient
sought a religious-based right to receive treatments not generally
provided for patients in like medical circumstances. The refusal of
such a benefit generally would not create any kind of temptation
or choice for the religious adherent, because they would have no
"choice" to make. Such patients would simply be forced, by economic necessity, to live with (or die with) a lack of certain treatments. 30° Moreover, there is nothing situationally similar to a
128 Id. at 406.
129 See id. at 404 (stating that a law is unconstitutional if its purpose or effect discriminates invidiously between religions).
130 It is possible that in some instances where the government denied benefits, the
individual would possess sufficient funds to pay for the treatment in question, and
thus would face a choice between using their own funds, or abandoning their religious belief that they must seek treatment. It still seems unlikely that the Court would
consider such a choice to constitute a burden. Generally, individuals must fund their

own religious practices. If the government is not constitutionally required to provide
funds or programs to sustain the right to life against parental child abuse, starvation,
or disease, seee.g., Deshaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189
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Sunday closing law, or protection of strict Sunday Sabbatarians, in
the medical futility context. A secular law, uniformly holding on
medical and financial grounds which treatments the government
will provide, does not afford a guarantee that individuals of any
particular religion will receive the treatments they believe to be appropriate; any correspondences between the governmental rules
and various religious beliefs as to when treatment is appropriate
would be far more unpolished and more inexact than that involved
in Sunday closing laws. The lack of a compelling comparison between the religious claimant who is denied treatment, and some
other, more favored religious beneficiary, would make the comparison between the religious claimant and the nonreligious claimant
more important. Why should a religious claimant receive expensive, life-sustaining treatments that are denied to another individual, who desires them on "secular" personal grounds, such as a
desire to live long enough to see a grandson married or a
grandchild born? Would not the provision of such treatment only
to religious claimants favor, rather than merely accommodate,
religion?
We can consider, for comparison purposes, an extreme hypothetical: a Word of Faith claimant, who believes that God intends
His children to be wealthy, demands that the government provide
him with financial benefits not provided to others, in order to fulfill his religious beliefs. It is, of course, easy to ridicule such claims,
as Janis Joplin did so effectively: "Oh Lord, won't you buy me a
Mercedes-Benz, my friends all drive Porsches, I must make
amends." Yet, however disconcerting, it is a sociological fact that a
significant group of American ministers teach that God intends
Christians to be rich, and that they will be, if they have enough
"faith."'3 1 It goes without saying that such a claim would be
laughed out of court, regardless of the sincerity of the claimant. It
is, of course, extremely unlikely that a Word of Faith claimant
would seek his wealth from the government in such a fashion. The
hypothetical, however, underscores the potential absurdity of a
religious claim to receive governmental benefits beyond those provided to others. Such claims, including the more serious claim of a
religious right to life-sustaining treatment not granted to nonreligious claimants, would generally be denied at an early analytic

(1989), then it is hard to see how the government can be required to fund religiouslymotivated treatments to sustain life.
131 See MCCONNELL, supra note 42, at 170-75.
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stage, by the holding that such a denial of benefits is not a "substantial burden" on the free exercise of religion under RFRA.
Physicians claiming a religious right not to provide treatments
would be more likely to state a successful RFRA claim. Physicians,
unlike patients, could generally state such a claim even in private
medical settings, because the threat of criminal or civil liability, or
removal of a medical practice license, would constitute governmental action. Such threats of governmental action would constitute
the kind of burden generally regarded as sufficient under traditional free exercise case law, and hence would satisfy RFRA's "substantial burden" requirement. The physician would be faced both
with a state requirement that she engage in conduct that the physician finds religiously objectionable, and a state created temptation
or choice to forego their religious practice in order to escape state
sanction or civil penalty.13 2
A closer question would arise where the physician is unable to
point to any specific religious prohibition for providing the treatment in question, but merely believes provision of the treatment to
be unjust or wasteful in relation to the health care system as a
whole. Such a claim could implicate the question of whether
RFRA incorporates pre-Smith case law distinguishing between religiously-motivated behavior, and behavior specifically proscribed or
mandated by a specific religious tenet. Courts relying on such a
distinction might hold that a physician religiously motivated not to
unjustly waste scarce medical resources is not "substantially burdened" by being required to provide such services, because no specific tenet of her religion forbids her actions. 133 By contrast, a
physician who believed that withholding or withdrawing treatment
was mandated by a religious duty of beneficence toward the patient, such that providing the treatment would constitute torture or
other serious harm to the patient, would probably state a sufficient
burden under most likely interpretations of RFRA, because the
physician could probably rely on a religious proscription against
harming other human beings.
A governmental entity may substantially burden the exercise
of religion under RFRA if it demonstrates that such burden is "the
least restrictive means of furthering... [a] compelling governmen152 See Berg, supra note 115, at 51-62 (discussing interpretation of "substantial burden" requirement of RFRA in relation to free exercise precedents).
133 Cf. id. at 56-57 (arguing that RFRA should protect both religiously-motivated
and religiously-mandated behavior in order to achieve equal treatment of different
religions).
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tal interest."1 " 4 Even where this test is treated as a kind of intermediary scrutiny balancing test, rather than as a literal "least
restrictive means" strict scrutiny test,13 5 the State generally should
be unable to meet it. In most instances, it would satisfy the governmental interest to allow other physicians to provide the treatment
in question. An instance where no other physicians or treatment
facilities were willing or able to provide the treatment in question
would prove more difficult. It would appear unfair to penalize a
physician for refusing to provide a treatment, however, based on
the unwillingness of others to provide such treatment. Indeed,
these refusals to accept the case could confirm the appropriateness
of the treating physician's refusal.
An analogy to abortion, or to physician-assisted suicide, underscores the conclusion that physicians or other medical care providers generally should not be penalized for refusing to provide
treatments that violate their religious conscience. It is difficult to
imagine requiringa physician with a religious objection to abortion
or assisted suicide to provide these medical services. The State
would, in many such instances, be requiring the physician to perform an act he or she personally believed to be morally equivalent
to murder, or at least to be a form of immoral killing. The rule
would probably be the same where medical futility is the issue.
Physicians objecting to providing life-sustaining treatments presumably would not consider such treatments to be morally
equivalent to murder, and thus arguably would not be as seriously
burdened. Nonetheless, a belief that providing a certain treatment
constituted a form of torture, or was otherwise harmful to the patient, could form the basis of a sufficiently serious burden. A physician who believes that provision of treatment violated principles of
justice and equality, by wasting scarce medical resources on treatments producing no benefit, may, as noted above, have difficulty
establishing a "substantial burden" on the exercise of religion.
Where such burden was established, such a belief would provide
the basis for a reasonably strong RFRA claim, particularly if it were
reasonably practicable to find a substitute medical provider. It is
difficult to predict the outcome of a religious claim not to waste
resources in an instance where no substitute care can be practicably arranged, because the burden on the physician could plausibly
42 U.S.CA. § 2000bb-1.
See Berg, supra note 115, at 26-51 (analyzing ambiguities in RFRA and pre-Smith
free exercise precedents concerning the standard of review applied to laws of general
application that substantially burden the free exercise of religion).
154

135
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be considered less significant than the negative impact on the patient. Nonetheless, it would seem that any state action penalizing
an individual for refusing to perform an act they believe, on religious grounds, to be seriously immoral, could form the basis of a
reasonably strong RFRA claim.
Physicians generally possess an extreme power advantage over
their patients. The physician is a permanent and respected part of
the medical care system who is being paid to provide medical care
to those in need; the patient, suffering to various degrees from the
pain and disability of serious illness, is a mere visitor within this
system and by role is the dependent party paying to receive help.
The physician possesses the power of knowledge, for even patients
with unusually informative physicians usually obtain comparatively
little knowledge of their own medical conditions. The patient's
subordination is underscored by numerous hospital routines, from
the vulnerability of the hospital gown (as compared to the physician's officious white coat) to the general understanding that the
patient's body and life history are to be laid bare to a wide variety
136
of strangers, as a part of the diagnostic and treatment process.
It initially seems odd that RFRA would offer significant protection to the dominant party, but little or no protection to the more
vulnerable, subordinate party. This oddness is a product of focusing on the medical futility situation. A patient's right to refuse treatment receives such strong protection under broad principles of
patient autonomy and informed consent that RFRA, while technically applicable, is largely superfluous.1 3 7 Our legal system is generally more accommodating to claims of a right to be left alone, than
it is to claims of a right to receive benefits or care.
136 John Ellard, writing in the MedicalJournalof Australia, vividly describes the hierarchal nature of the physician-patient relationship:
In most medical consultations there are two people. One of them lays
down the time, the place, the duration of the interaction and charges a
fee for being there. Further, the person paying the fee is expected to
reveal his or her personal secrets, to disrobe if requested and to permit
such indignities as a rectal examination without demur. The person
laying down the rules is under no obligation to make any personal disclosures and is very likely to take umbrage if requested to disrobe or to
offer his or her rectum for examination. I think that we may safely conclude that it is not a meeting of equals, but an unequal relationship in
which one person has more power than the other; there is a hierarchy.
I believe that whenever there is a hierarchy such as this there is a possibility of exploitation and that the greater the hierarchy the greater the
possibility.
John Ellard, Medical Ethics-Fact or Fiction?, 158 MED. J. AuSm. 460, 463 (1993).
137 See Smolin, supra note 111, at 45-49.
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Thus, in regard to medical futility, RFRA is primarily applicable where it is least likely to be used, in instances where physicians
seek to establish a religious right not to treat. Overall, it would
seem that RFRA, the Free Exercise Clause, and the Establishment
Clause, will in the vast majority of conflicts concerning medical futility have no direct legal significance. Despite-or more likely because of-the overwhelmingly religious nature of the issues raised
by medical futility, religion will generally be legally irrelevant to
those issues.
V.

CONCLUSION:

LESSONS FROM THE BABY RENA CASE

The climax of the conflict between Dr. Pollack and the foster
parents occurred on the last day of Baby Rena's life. Dr. Pollack
had decided that he would withdraw the respirator, without permission from the city or from the ethics committee, if he could
persuade the parents to "acquiesce." Pollack wanted Rena to die in
the arms of her foster parents, rather than in "a bed with medications infusing in her and a machine pumping air in and out of her
chest." The parents refused to accept Pollack's belief that the child
was close to death, and believed that they were being "doers of the
Word" by refusing to acquiesce in the withdrawal of the respirator.
It is interesting how little formal legal principles mattered at
this critical moment. The foster parents presumably lacked the
legal standing to override the city, the actual legal guardian, and
authorize withdrawal of treatment. Yet Pollack was confident that
the foster parent's acquiescence would shield him from any negative consequences from ordering withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment. Pollack may have felt that it would be wrong, as he later
expressed it, for a physician to unilaterally "assume moral as well as
medical responsibilities concerning life-and-death decisions;" he
may have assumed that the legal system would have to respect a
decision shared by those most intimately involved with Rena.
Thus, the foster parents, who in law generally have few legal rights,
had by their investment of nurture, love and time acquired a kind
of moral and even quasi-legal status as full parents.
Within this shadowy, uncertain legal world, the contrasting
religious and moral views of Pollack and the foster parents clashed,
as they gave different answers to the pressing question of how to
live out their obligations to a desperately ill child lying in a hospital
bed. The foster parents' refusal to accept withdrawal of treatment
apparently was based on their expectation that God would miraculously heal Rena, and their corollary belief that they were required
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to evidence faith in God's capacity or promise to heal Rena by continuing all medical efforts to assist Rena. The foster family's faith
thus required them to deny what Greenawalt considers the shared
form of reasoning of a liberal democracy, the assumption that "the
regularities of the physical world consistently apply." It is highly
probable that the foster parents shared Dr. Pollack's compassionate impulse to allow Rena to die in their arms; they didn't share,
however, Pollack's belief that Rena was dying. The conflict between the parents and Dr. Pollack apparently centered on the
question of whether to rely upon the empirical medical evidence,
which indicated that Rena was dying, or whether to rely upon an
interpretation of the "Word of God" indicating that Rena could (or
would) be healed, particularly if the parents exercised sufficient
"faith."
It is hard to believe that this tragic and deeply moving conflict
at the hospital bed of Rena should, because it implicates public
policy issues and involves government funding of health care, be
cleansed or purified of its religious overtones. It is also hard to see
why those who believe in miracles, and who seek to act upon that
belief, should be uniquely silenced or disenfranchised, based on
the view that their religious beliefs place them outside the "shared
forms of reasoning" embraced by a "liberal democracy." Baby
Rena's foster parents, as African-Americans, already face the difficulties of living in a majority white society-are they to be further
marginalized because their religion does not fit the preferred
forms of law professors, physicians, or other elites?
Respect for persons would seem to require a listening to, and
struggling with, the whole person. We should hear that the foster
parents' belief in miraculous healing motivated both their public
act of accepting legal and personal responsibility for the care and
nurture of Rena, and their equally public and equally religious act
of seeking maximum treatment for Rena based on a hope that God
would heal her. Respect for persons also requires that we listen to,
and struggle with, Dr. Pollack's belief that he owed Rena the dignity and respect of a more natural and compassionate death. Pollack's fear of making moral decisions alone, apart from those to
whom Rena "belonged," 3 8 must also be heard. Finally, we should
138 It is important to emphasize that belonging has separate meanings: that of familial or other human identification, as in belonging to one's family or other human
group, or that of legal control. Is it too much to say that Rena's relationship to her
foster family partook more of the first meaning, and her relationship to her legal
guardian, the city, partook more of the second meaning? Could it also be said that
legal responsibility for children should generally rest with adults who serve as the day-
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strive to hear the voice of Rena: Rena struggling in pain as machines maintained her life, and Rena responding with love to those
who loved her. When her parents left her for the final time in that
hospital bed, she managed, despite the medical equipment in her
mouth and her weakened state, to call out "Mama." The religious
belief that denied Rena the chance to die in her "Mama's" arms
may anger us, as it did Dr. Pollack. But we must remember that it
was that same religious belief that permitted Rena, otherwise an
abandoned orphan in the custody of the government, the opportunity to experience the great human gifts of motherly and fatherly
love.
A political theory, or a constitutional theory, that requires that
we do something less than commit ourselves to listening to the
whole person, seems to this writer to constitute a dehumanizing
theory. Listening will not resolve satisfactorily every difficult issue
of medical futility, medical ethics, or more broadly of public policy.
Listening, however, is a precondition of a true "liberal democracy,"
or at least of a humane society. Political theory and constitutional
principles should therefore promote, rather than inhibit, a full listening to all human beings, without excluding the religious dimensions or beliefs of those human beings.
Listening, at best, can lead to dialogue. The foster parents
and medical staff appeared to experience difficulty in establishing
dialogue, given the different languages of religious belief and medical science. It seems unfortunate to this writer that the hospital
personnel who shared, in at least a broad sense, a Christian faith
with the foster parents, appeared unwilling or unable to engage
them in regard to those beliefs. The staff physician and the hospital chaplain who didn't think God needed a respirator to perform
a miracle apparently never engaged the foster family in religious
dialogue."l 9 The Christian physician whom the foster parents used
as an advocate or mediator appeared not to engage the foster parents' interpretation of what the Christian faith required. Religion
to-day parents (psychological parents?), because such a parental role combines the
interpersonal and the legal meanings of the word 'belong?' Is it also possible that
where the interpersonal and legal roles of parents are splintered, the legal role can
tend toward a kind of slavery, that is, legal control of a human being outside of familial identification, whereas the combining of the interpersonal and legal renders such
legal control into a beneficent 'guardianship' which protects the process of familial
identification from governmental interference. Under this analysis, then, strong families (and parental rights) would be necessary to freedom, and the cultural or legal
destruction of the family could represent a trend toward enslavement.
139 See supra note 58.
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was treated as so private as to be beyond discourse; dialogue was
largely limited to medical science and secular ethics.
A true respect for persons can sometimes involve or require
not only listening to others, but also engaging the other. You don't
need a doctor of theology degree, or a strong personal religious
belief, to engage the question of whether turning off a ventilator
robs God of His authority over life and death, or whether faith in
the power of God requires maximum medical care. A power imbalance can make dialogue difficult. Yet, the fact that no one had a
right to force the foster parents to change their religious beliefs
should not mean that no one had a right, or even a duty, to question and engage those beliefs, particularly as applied to the care of
Baby Rena. Questioning the foster parents' beliefs in God, Jesus,
the Bible, and miracles would have been vain and counterproductive; engaging the application of these beliefs to the care of Baby
Rena might have been loving and productive. Religious freedom
does not require that religion be above questioning or dialogue.
The legal and moral ambiguities implicit in the question of
who should make life-and-death decisions for Baby Rena produced
enough ambiguity in power relationships such that dialogue about
religion might have been fruitful. At least it would have been one
more attempt among the participants to honor Rena, their own
beliefs, and one another.
The question of whose views should trump, when dialogue
fails, cannot be easily answered. Integrity would suggest that
before medical science as a whole assumes broad authority to
trump the desires of patients or their families, it admit the nonmedical, and even religious, nature of the questions posed by the
concept of "medical futility." It would be wrong to permit
medicine to use the authority it has gained from scientific and
technical proficiency, and use that authority as a cloak to gain authority over questions that most in the society consider moral and
religious.
There will always be conflicts where understanding and dialogue fail, which in the end are resolved by resort to law and
power. The rules regarding those situations, where dialogue fails,
are not necessarily more important than the institution of humane
practices that seek to reduce the necessity of resort to law and
power. The practice of persons engaging one another in dialogue,
and the understanding that religion can be a subject of such dialogue, might reduce the necessity of resolving conflict by the force
of law. In this way, uncloaking religion and allowing it to enter
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dialogue, and be engaged by dialogue, may serve the end of a more
humane society.

